Social Dollars: The Economic Impact of Customer Participation in a Firm-Sponsored Online Customer Community

Puneet Manchanda
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109, pmanchan@umich.edu

Grant Packard
Laurier School of Business and Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5, Canada, gpackard@wlu.ca

Adithya Pattabhiramaiah
Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332, adithyap@gatech.edu

Many firms operate customer communities online. This is motivated by the belief that customers who join the community become more engaged with the firm and/or its products, and as a result, increase their economic activity with the firm. We describe this potential economic benefit as “social dollars.” This paper contributes evidence for the existence and source of social dollars using data from a multichannel entertainment products retailer that launched a customer community online. We find a significant increase in customer expenditures attributable to customers joining the firm’s community. While self-selection is a concern with field data, we rule out multiple alternative explanations. Social dollars persist over the time period observed and arose primarily in the online channel. To assess the source of the social dollar, we hypothesize and test whether it is moderated by participation behaviors conceptually linked to common attributes of customer communities. Our results reveal that posters (versus lurkers) of community content and those with more (versus fewer) social ties in the community generated more (fewer) social dollars. We found a null effect for our measure of the informational advantage expected to accrue to products that differentially benefit from content posted by like-minded community members. This overall pattern of results suggests a stronger social than informational source of economic benefits for firm operators of customer communities. Several implications for firms considering investments in and/or managing online customer communities are discussed.

1. Introduction

People have long communed as consumers. From Apple acolytes to Java junkies, Tupperware partiers to European car clubbers, like-minded consumers have engaged with one another in customer communities, i.e., networks of individuals who engage in social interactions about their shared enthusiasm for and use of specific brandmarks, products or consumption activities (Algesheimer et al. 2005, Bagozzi and Dholakia 2002, Porter and Donthu 2008, Rheingold 1993).

The last decade has witnessed an explosion of marketer interest in these consumer-powered social engines of brand engagement, trust, and loyalty (Porter and Donthu 2008, Williams and Cothrel 2000, Wirtz et al. 2013). Consumer adoption of the Internet, social media, and mobile technologies has been a central driver of this enthusiasm. Over 70% of Americans (Forrester 2012) and an estimated one billion people across the planet (Eddy 2012) are using social media, spending over one-third of their waking hours in online environments that allow them to present a public or private profile, establish social ties with like-minded others, and exchange information of mutual interest socially (Boyd and Ellison 2007).

The movement of like-minded consumers into online communities represents a major business opportunity for firms, whether these communities are embedded in independent websites, firm-operated websites or third-party social media platforms (Forrester 2012). A recent IBM survey of 1,709 CEOs from over 60 countries reveals that they believe online customer communities are the second most important means by which they will engage customers in the future (after face-to-face interactions and well ahead of traditional media). Nearly 60% of these
executives plan to invest (or invest more) in online communities over the next few years, leading to an expected total annual marketing expenditure in online customer communities of nearly $5 billion by 2016 (Paul 2012, Schniederjans et al. 2013, Forrester 2012). While firms and their top managers express high levels of confidence in the marketing efficacy of these communities, there is surprisingly little evidence documenting the economic benefits of online customer communities (whether firm-sponsored or hosted by third parties). In fact, doubts have been expressed in the industry about the positive return on investment (ROI) of customer communities hosted on third-party social media platforms such as Facebook (Vranica and Raice 2012). Firms have also articulated other concerns such as loss of control and the potential of consumer backlash when customer communities are hosted by a third-party (Thompson et al. 2011). This has led many companies to invest in building their own online customer communities. We estimate that, depending on the definition of the attributes of a firm-hosted online customer community, between 25 and 50 of the top 100 global brands (Interbrand 2011) host their own such community. In addition, Forrester (2012) reports that 18% of all businesses around the globe are making online customer community investments independent of third-party platforms.

It is not clear which attributes of customer communities firms should prioritize to maximize their economic outcome. Is providing customers with a rich source of user-generated information from like-minded individuals the key to community success? Alternatively, is it the ability for customers to voice their opinions by posting content that is more critical? Providing a mechanism for customers to establish formal friend ties may also be an essential community attribute. While each of these have been described as key identifiers of online customer communities (Wirtz et al. 2013) and their importance theorized in the literature (e.g., Algesheimer et al. 2010, Bagozzi and Dholakia 2002, Dholakia et al. 2004, McWilliam 2000, Porter and Donthu 2008, Schau et al. 2009), we are unaware of research that directly examines the relationship between social and informational attributes of customer communities and their economic consequences for the firm.

In this paper, we focus on quantifying the incremental economic benefit of such communities and the source(s) of this benefit in relation to specific community participation behaviors using actual transaction and participation data. We label this incremental expenditure social dollars. We do this with the help of a novel data set from a multichannel (online and offline) retailer that decided to launch an online customer community.

Our data and research approach adds to the literature on online customer communities on multiple dimensions. First, and perhaps most important, we use actual behavioral data to investigate the economic impact on the firm offering such a community. Second, the availability of consumer panel data before and after the formation of the community allows us to assess the potential implication of self-selection common in field data analysis (Shriver et al. 2013). While we cannot rule out selection on unobservables with certainty, several falsification tests and robustness checks provide compelling support that self-selection is unlikely to explain our results. Third, the long time series of our data allows us to investigate whether the change in purchase behavior that results from joining the community is a short-term effect driven by the novelty of the event (i.e., the formation of the community) or a more persistent phenomenon. Fourth, given the multichannel nature of our data, we can test whether the formation of the community affects behavior differentially across channels. Finally, we use the observed participation behaviors and interactions among community members to isolate mechanisms that may underlie the economic effect of online customer community participation. This allows us to provide theoretically-grounded empirical evidence for how social dollars come about.

Our results show that, in the firm setting we observe, social dollars represent a double-digit percentage increase in customer expenditures. While it is possible that our finding is idiosyncratic, this increase represents an economically significant overall return for the firm as it more than covers the fixed cost of setting up the community as well as the variable cost of operating it. We subject our base estimate of the social dollars to multiple robustness tests and demonstrate that it is indeed robust. For example, we find that the social dollar estimate is robust to selection on observables and unobservables. We find that social dollars persist over time. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of channel cannibalization. We also rule out a series of alternative explanations for the existence of these social dollars.

Finally, the economic effect of the community should be linked not only to joining but also to specific behaviors conceptually linked to the consumer benefits of customer community participation. We
examine participation behaviors that prior theoretical and survey-based research suggest are central to the definition and benefits of customer communities (e.g., Algesheimer et al. 2005, 2010; Jang et al. 2008; Dholakia and Vianello 2009). We predict and demonstrate that consumers who lurk (versus posting content) in the community will recognize diminished social benefits from their lack of participation, thus diminishing their economic engagement with the firm. Similarly, consumers who heighten their social connection to the community by establishing friendships and ties obtain additional social benefits, leading to heightened economic engagement with the firm. These results demonstrate that customer use of specific social attributes of online customer communities are indeed linked to the financial outcomes to which their firm hosts aspire, i.e., social dollars.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we discuss the conceptual and empirical literature in which our research is grounded. We describe the research setting and data in §3. Sections 4 and 5 describe our modeling and analysis strategy. Finally, we discuss the managerial implications of our findings in §6. Section 7 provides concluding remarks, a discussion of the limitations of this paper, and possible future avenues of research.

2. Conceptual Background

2.1. Benefits of Mere Membership in an Online Customer Community

The conceptual definitions of the attributes and consequences of customer communities are rich and varied. The most cited of these is Muniz and O’Guinn (2001, p. 412), who described a brand community as a “specialized, non-geographically bound community, based on a structured set of social relationships among admirers of a branded good or service” and offered three specific markers of these communities: shared consciousness, rituals and traditions, and a sense of moral responsibility. Researchers subsequently proposed an expanded conception to describe marketplace communities or consumption communities as relationships and behaviors not only of customers with brands but also among customers themselves, between the customer and the firm, and between the customer and the product in use (McAlexander et al. 2002). Research examining these relationships in technology-mediated settings has sometimes described them as online or virtual communities (Balasubramanian and Mahajan 2001, Dholakia et al. 2004, Kozinets 2002, Porter and Donthu 2008). Overall, customer community has come to be the most common term used to describe a group or network of individuals who engage in social interactions about their shared enthusiasm for or use of specific brandmarks, products, retail environments or consumption activities whether in online or offline settings (Algesheimer et al. 2010, Bagozzi and Dholakia 2002, Porter and Donthu 2008, Rheingold 1993). Empirical investigations of customer communities include those that operate independently of the brand or firm (e.g., Dholakia et al. 2004) and those that are organized and controlled by a commercial firm, i.e., firm-sponsored (Kannan et al. 2000, Gruner et al. 2014, Porter and Donthu 2008).

Firms that operate customer communities are said to have the opportunity to increase customer engagement and loyalty among community members (Fournier and Lee 2009, Porter and Donthu 2008, Williams and Cothrel 2000). These benefits are said to accrue from an increased sense of brand community identification, i.e., the perceived belonging that arises through membership in a customer community (Algesheimer et al. 2005, Bagozzi and Dholakia 2006). The expectation is that the customer’s increased sense of belonging, engagement or loyalty will lead to better economic outcomes for the firm, as exemplified by predictions that firm sponsors of customer communities will be “richly rewarded with peerless customer loyalty and impressive economic returns” (Hagel and Armstrong 1997, p. 2). While Mathwick et al. (2008) were primarily concerned with how these benefits enhance value to customers, they and other researchers also point to increased customer loyalty and commitment, which should lead to incremental economic gains as downstream consequences for the firm (Algesheimer et al. 2005, Balasubramanian and Mahajan 2001, Porter and Donthu 2008). Using surveys and self-report data, some academic research has reported an increase in purchase intention among online customer community members (Algesheimer et al. 2005, Porter and Donthu 2008). Other researchers have shown that enabling consumer membership in a firm-sponsored online customer community is one of seven factors linked to increased purchase intentions and willingness to pay (WTP) a price premium with online retailers (Srinivasan et al. 2002).

Two recent studies have examined the consequences of customer community membership using behavioral data. Zhu et al. (2012) found that firm-sponsored online customer community membership was linked to greater financial risk taking as observed in lending (Proper.com) and bidding (eBay Germany) behaviors. Algesheimer et al. (2010) examined the behavioral consequences of customer community membership and participation at eBay Germany. They found that bidders and sellers at the auction site became more selective and conservative in their
behavior as a result of online community participation, leading to null or negative effects of community membership on individual-level bidding volume, product listings, average amount spent by buyers, and revenue earned by sellers. A unique aspect of the customer communities investigated in the above two studies is that they both exist to make markets. Thus, most of the important marketing mix elements (such as product and price) in both of these settings are a function of the actions of independent agents rather than of the firm. The Algesheimer et al. (2010) study, in particular, can be seen as complementary to the setting and findings from this paper. Overall, therefore, with the two exceptions mentioned above, there has been little empirical assessment of the impact of mere membership in online customer communities to the firm.

2.2. Benefits of Behavioral Participation in an Online Customer Community

If the sense of belonging that arises from mere membership in an online customer community is the foundation on which economic benefits accrue to the firm, the nature and extent of the customer’s participation in the community should be the mechanism through which these benefits are moderated. As discussed in the prior section, customer communities are commonly defined by the nature of the attributes and behaviors within them, i.e., (a) social interactions that occur among, (b) a structured set of social relationships. These behaviors include the social transmission of product experiences, recommendations or advice, and developing social relationships among individuals who share common interests (Algesheimer et al. 2010, Brown et al. 2007, Dholakia et al. 2004, Muniz and O’Guinn 2001, Schau et al. 2009). In this section, we provide additional support for our predictions that the extent to which a community member participates in the community by (a) interacting socially through content contribution (i.e., posting versus lurking), (b) consuming more information posted for products that are more likely to benefit from the like-mindedness of community members (i.e., preference heterogeneity), and (c), establishing structured social relationships (i.e., friend ties) will moderate the economic impact of community membership.

Posting vs. Lurking: Schlosser (2005) describes two types of consumer participants in Internet-based transmissions of product information: posters, who actively share their product experiences online, and lurkers, who read others’ postings without communicating themselves. Lurkers are generally believed to represent the majority of people in online customer communities, while a minority of members generate the content (McWilliam 2000). A survey-based investigation of online customer communities found that the act of content contribution by community participants was positively related to member brand commitment (Jang et al. 2008). Posters commit more conspicuous public behaviors in a community, leading to an increase in their sense of belonging or engagement with the focal brand or product whether the community is real or virtual (Kozinets 1999, Laroche et al. 2012). An empirical link between community-driven customer engagement of this kind and self-reported purchase behaviors was first shown in a survey of car club community members (Algesheimer et al. 2005). This finding is also in keeping with theorizing by Balasubramanian and colleagues (Balasubramanian and Mahajan 2001), who suggest that posters may gain approval utility from the benefit of others consuming their contributions to the community, with an expected consequence of increased expenditure with the firm. Notably, while several researchers have reported behavioral or economic impacts of posting on the purchase behavior of the consumers of this information (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006, Godes and Mayzlin 2004), we are unaware of prior work reporting the impact of posting versus lurking on the poster (or lurker).

Preference Heterogeneity and the Role of Information: Participation in online customer communities should offer consumers unique informational benefits due to the nature of product information available within (versus outside) the community. Most of the product opinions shared by consumers online are offered by anonymous or socially distant sources, giving the consumer little means by which they can assess the personal relevance of the recommendation (Dellarocas 2003, Ma and Agarwal 2007). In contrast, both offline and online customer communities are by definition organized around the shared interests of like-minded individuals (Algesheimer et al. 2010, Bagozzi and Dholakia 2002, Porter and Donthu 2008) who are more demographically and psychologically similar to one another (Dholakia and Vianello 2009). Customer communities should thus tend to exhibit heightened homogeneity in individual attitudes (McPherson et al. 2001, Watts et al. 2002). Consumers expect that because homogeneous sources of product information are more likely to share the consumer’s own attitudes and preferences, they are more diagnostic to the information task and are more likely to influence purchase intentions (Brock 1965, Eagly et al. 1978, Gershoff et al. 2001).

In our setting, while we do not observe the extent to which customers share attitudes towards products, we do observe the nature (i.e., category or genre) of some of the products they purchase. To link product attributes to the shared interests or like-mindedness (attitudinal homogeneity) of community participants, we rely on Feick and Higie (1992), who empirically
demonstrate that homogeneous sources of product information are particularly persuasive for products with more heterogeneous preference structures (e.g., restaurants) than for products that can be more objectively assessed (e.g., personal computers). In short, like-minded people are better sources of information for products for which subjective tastes or preferences vary. If there is an informational benefit to gaining product information from like-minded participants in a customer community, we should observe a disproportionate benefit (i.e., increased expenditure) for products that are higher in preference heterogeneity. Therefore, we predict that the effect of customer community participation on purchases (i.e., the social dollar) will be moderated by the extent to which the products purchased are perceived to hold greater preference heterogeneity.

Structured Social Relationships (friend ties): In online customer communities, the list of explicit social connections made among members for the purposes of social interactions are commonly described as “friend ties” (Zaglia 2013). These ties can be said to represent one form of the structured social relationships among members that are central to brand and customer communities (Muniz and O’Guinn 2001). When a firm sponsor facilitates the creation of friend ties, it is said to promote social interactions among members, reinforcing their social engagement with the community, and creating collective value for both the customer and firm (Dholakia et al. 2004, Schau et al. 2009). A common belief among marketers and researchers interested in brand communities is that the firm component of this value is in part economic, i.e., “Forming relationships among like-minded consumers who share one’s interest in the brand will be credible and impactful in persuading and bonding customers to the brand, leading them to make more purchase behaviors” (Bagozzi and Dholakia 2006, p. 46). We are unaware of research that has directly tested the assumed link between community participation (such as posting or friend tie formation) and the expected economic consequence of hosting an online customer community (i.e., increased purchase behavior). For example, while Algesheimer et al. (2005) find relationships between (a) community engagement and participation behavior, and (b) community engagement and brand-related purchase behavior in a survey of car club community members, they do not predict or report a test for the potential link between community participation activities and brand-related purchase behavior. Zhu and colleagues demonstrate that the degree to which a consumer participates (e.g., posts) in auction and lending communities is linked to their risk-seeking tendencies (Zhu et al. 2012). They are not, however, primarily concerned with the consequences of risk-seeking consumer behavior for the firm. In contrast, we examine participatory behaviors linked to the fundamental theorized benefits to the firm of customer community participation.

To summarize, we expect that the social dollar will be moderated by the extent to which the community member leverages attributes that should be fundamental to community success, i.e., engaging in social interactions (posting versus lurking), leveraging user-generated content more for product categories that should benefit the most from a customer community (category preference heterogeneity), and creating structured social relationships (friend ties). We expect a negative (positive) effect of lurking (posting), and a positive effect of the presence and volume of friend ties on the size of the social dollar at the individual member level. Finally, because these communities should foster social interactions among like-minded individuals, we predict a larger effect as the preference heterogeneity for a product category increases.

3. Research Setting and Data
Our data comes from a large North American retailer of entertainment and informational media products (e.g., books, movies, music).² The firm is the largest retailer in its market by sales volume in its core product category, and operates in both retail and online channels, with approximately 10% of total revenues occurring online for the firm’s fiscal year 2009.

The firm launched its own online customer community in September 2007. The formation and existence of this community was communicated via mass marketing to consumers and current customers. Marketing communications were comprised of signage in stores, banner advertising on the firm’s website, print advertising in national newspapers, and the firm’s house opt-in email list. Advertising announcing the launch of the online customer community was untargeted; different customer segments were not given differential exposure to this announcement. Participation in the community was purely voluntary on an opt-in basis; no financial incentive was given to customers to join the community. In addition, after the launch of the community, the firm did not engage in marketing activity that was targeted at community members. In other words, customers who joined the community and customers who did not were shown the same marketing activity.

Our empirical setting is consistent with this literature’s conceptual description of a customer community. Specifically, we observe a firm-organized and operated online environment that the firm explicitly describes internally and to the public as a customer community.

²Because of the proprietary nature of the data, the firm has requested that its identity not be divulged.
community. Individuals who join the customer community share textual and graphical information about themselves and their product preferences and/or recommendations with other customers, graphically display a variety of personal and product-related content on a personal profile page, engage in discussions on community chat boards, and establish formal friendships. Customer community participants contribute a variety of user-generated content for the consumption of others who are either in their own network of friends (i.e., private content) or for the customer community at large (i.e., public content). While the content of the customer community interactions we observe is most commonly about products in use (McAlexander et al. 2002), we also observe conversations about the firm brand (i.e., the retailer). Thus, our setting is highly consistent with prior descriptions of a firm-sponsored online customer community (Algesheimer et al. 2010, Brown et al. 2007, Dholakia et al. 2004, Kannan et al. 2000, Muniz and O’Guinn 2001, Schau et al. 2009).

The data used in our analysis was extracted in January 2009. Using an nth-select random sampling procedure, the firm generated a random selection of 26,624 community members (from a population of about 266,000 such members) for analysis. The firm provided us with two kinds of data, transactional data and community activity data, for these members. The transactional data represent actual purchases made by these members in the firm’s online and retail (offline) channels. We observe offline purchases for some community members via the use of a firm-sponsored loyalty card. Customers could sign up for this card by paying a modest annual fee ($20). All customers in our primary analysis sample (across both treatment and control groups) had signed up for the loyalty card, hence there are no differences on this dimension between the two groups. Across the firm’s entire customer database, approximately 16% of customers had a loyalty card and they accounted for approximately 40% of the firm’s total sales revenue. Each record in the transactional data includes the date of the customer’s first purchase, the customer’s first name, the customer’s geographic location, and details on each purchase event. Each purchase event indicates the channel and date of purchase, the specific product(s) purchased, customer expenditure net of any standing or promotional discounts received for each product within the transaction, and each product’s category classification. While we focus on the loyalty card holders in our primary analysis because it provides the most conservative estimate of the social dollar and supports a multichannel view of the effect, to enhance generalizability we also report our analysis restricted to online customers who are not loyalty card holders as part of a robustness check.

The community activity data we observe includes the date members joined the community and the social behaviors in which they have participated within the community. Specifically, we observe the volume of several different types of user-generated content such as peer-to-peer product recommendations, product reviews written, Top 10 lists published, and the number of products (e.g., book cover graphics) displayed on their personal profile page.

There was a difference of 15 months between the data extract (January 2009) and the formation of the customer community (September 2007). We therefore also asked the firm to provide 15 months of data before the launch of the community for the random sample extracted. This allowed us to create a “pre” period for comparison. The firm provided transactional data going back to June 2006 (i.e., 15 months before the launch of the community), for the full analysis sample. In addition to the sample drawn from the community members described above, we asked the company to provide transactional data on customers who did not participate in the community to create a control group. The firm drew a random sample from customers (the total population was just under one million) who had not become members of the customer community during our observation period and who transacted at least once with the firm (online or offline) in the 30 months from June 2006 to January 2009, inclusive. They provided us data for 6,091 online transactional accounts for our control group. Of these accounts, 2,352 were also loyalty card holders, which provides full visibility of their purchase behavior with the firm (online and offline (retail) channels).

In the subsequent discussion, we designate the 15-month period before the launch of the community as T1 (“pre-community,” June 2006 to September 2007, representing five quarters denoted Q1 through Q5), and the period after the launch of the community as T2 (“post-community,” October 2007 to January 2009; quarters denoted as Q6 through Q10). Note that while the exogenous change (i.e., the launch of the customer community) occurs at a specific point in time (September 2007), a customer can decide to join the community at any time after the launch. We address this issue in detail and exploit this data attribute in our analysis. Taken from the full sample described above, our primary analysis sample includes customers for whom we observe behavior across both sales channels (via the loyalty card) and who transact at least once in T1 and T2. We do this to ensure full visibility of the customer’s expenditure with the firm (across both channels) and to control for differential entry and exit patterns in the treatment and control groups (Blundell et al. 1998). This has the added benefit of making our results as conservative as possible (results without the entry/exit restriction
are described in §4.4. The application of our primary analysis criterion limits this sample to 7,909 (30% of the full treatment sample) and 1,255 (21% of the full control sample) customers in the treatment and control groups, respectively.

A comparison of the two groups on behavioral variables (e.g., total expenditure) is provided in Table 1. The table shows that there is no significant difference in the total expenditure per customer and the number of orders per customer in the 15-month period before the community was launched. However, average purchase size or the per order dollar expenditure is marginally higher (and statistically significant) for the control group. After the launch of the community, the total mean expenditure and the number of orders increases for both the treatment and control groups while the average purchase changes very little for both groups. In terms of demographics, we see some minor differences (see Table 2), with the treatment group having a slightly higher proportion of women, a slightly larger household size, and slightly lower access to computers.

4. Estimation Strategy and Results

In this section, we present a road map for our analysis approach (as laid out in Table 3) with a brief description of the role played by each of these analyses. First, we describe our modeling approach to estimate the magnitude of social dollars (if they exist) in §4.1. As noted earlier, we exploit the exogenous formation of the online customer community and the availability of a control group. We replicate our results with demographic and behavioral controls. Given that our data do not originate from a setting characterized by perfect randomization (e.g., a field experiment), we need to ensure that our findings are not driven by self-selection (which would lead to nonrandom assignment to treatment and control groups). We therefore run a series of analyses controlling for self-selection based on the observables as well as unobservables in §4.2. Having demonstrated the robustness of social dollars to selection concerns, we then explore the validity of other possible explanations that could account for the social dollar in §4.3.

4.1. Existence and Magnitude of the Social Dollar

Given the structure of our data set, we use a panel specification to help us obtain the magnitude of the social dollars. The observation of transactions of the same customers before and after helps us rule out alternative explanations such as selection. The presence of a control group helps us rule against the influence of exogenous factors that may influence transaction expenditure. We aggregate the detailed purchase data to these two periods (T1 and T2) rather than leveraging a more fragmented time series form to mitigate potential serial correlation and grouped error term effects (Bertrand et al. 2004). The specification we estimate is

\[ R_{igt} = \beta_1 I_g + \beta_2 I_t + \beta_3 I_g I_t + \beta_4 X_{ig} + e_{igt}, \]  

where \( R_{igt} \) is the outcome of interest (the total dollar expenditure at the individual level for most of our analyses) for consumer \( i \) in group \( g \) ∈ \{Treatment, Control\} at time \( t \) ∈ \{T1, T2\}. The \( X_{ig} \) consists of a vector of county-level demographic variables (e.g., median household income, average household

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Purchase Statistics by Group—Both Periods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1: 15 months pre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total spend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average purchase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2: 15 months post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total spend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average purchase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* \( p < 0.05 \); \** \( p < 0.01 \); \*** \( p < 0.001 \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Summary Statistics by Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Female(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure at launch (months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Household Size(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Family Income (× 1,000$)(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Computer Access(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Spending ($)(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1 (Pre) Quarter Spend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 (Post) Quarter Spend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Gender inferred for 82% of sample using a standard “genderizer” database.

\(^2\) County-level statistics.

\* \( p < 0.05 \); \** \( p < 0.01 \); \*** \( p < 0.001 \); \† \( p < 0.1 \).
Table 3 Overview of Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Baseline OLS expenditure regression</td>
<td>Quantifying our treatment effect of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Expenditure regression including demographic controls</td>
<td>Controlling for observed customer heterogeneity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Expenditure regression with:</td>
<td>Controlling for potential biases due to treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1</td>
<td>(a) Selection on observables—Matching estimators</td>
<td>self-selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2</td>
<td>(b) Selection on unobservables—Heckman/semi-parametric selection models</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.3</td>
<td>Expenditure regression using a subset of the treatment as the “control” group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Testing for the validity of alternate explanations for social dollars:</td>
<td>Assessing whether competing alternative explanations can explain our results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1</td>
<td>The role of outliers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2</td>
<td>The novelty effect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.3</td>
<td>Differential trends in customer loyalty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.4</td>
<td>Outlier months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.5</td>
<td>Joining for a reason unrelated to the online community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Robustness checks vis-à-vis sample construction</td>
<td>Testing for the impact of relaxing the “loyalty card holder only” constraint and allowing for differential entry/exit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differential group entry and/or exit represents significant threats to the assumption of no sample composition changes across groups in panel estimation (Blundell et al. 1998). For example, one could expect that a customer community attracts new customers to the firm. From the firm’s perspective, it would be natural to include these customers in calculating the returns from launching the community, as these new customers generate additional purchase revenues for the firm. Note that this creates a less conservative test than the one we adopt. The criterion for our primary analysis sample that each consumer transact at least once in T1 and T2 ensures that we include only existing, active customers in both groups. This resolves uncertainty in the causes of any differential entry or exit by fixing group composition over time, and avoids the possible confound of attributing higher post-period revenues to the community, which may have been contributed mainly by new customers. Subsequently, in §4.4, we relax the use of both the loyalty card and entry/exit restriction criteria used in our primary analysis to explore their respective impacts on our findings.

To conduct our basic analysis, we use the date of the launch of the community as the temporal “break,” even though customers do not all join on that particular date. Specifically, we classify a customer who joins the community at any point in time (until the end of our data series 15 months later) into the treatment group. We do this because otherwise the same customer will enter both the control and treatment groups, thus invalidating our identification strategy. Note also that this classification scheme works against our finding social dollars. This is because by including customers who do not join right away, we are in effect including “untreated” customers in our treatment group, thus biasing our estimate of social dollars towards zero. In other words, our estimate of social dollars will be conservative. We also exploit this feature of our data (i.e., that not everybody in the treatment group joins at the same time) as one of our tests ruling against selection on unobservables.

As presented in Table 4, our results show that the social dollars, as represented by \( \beta_3 \) in Equation (1) above, exist (i.e., are statistically different from zero) and are $127.01 in magnitude over the 15-month observation period (approximately $102 on an annualized basis). Using an annual base expenditure of $676.69 (in T2) for the treatment group, social dollars are estimated to be 19% of expenditures post the

---

4 These data were collected from the 2006 National Census county-level database.
launch of the customer community. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical result documenting that an online customer community can lead to a direct increase in total customer-level expenditure for its firm sponsor.

Two aspects of this result are noteworthy. First, as noted earlier, the brand name under which this customer community operates is a retail brand selling a variety of individually-branded books, DVDs, CDs, and a selection of ancillary gift items (e.g., bookends, pens, greeting cards). In essence, the retail brand name is an umbrella brand associated with a specific assortment of product categories. This can be contrasted with a brand such as Lego that sets up its customer community in the context of Lego’s toy building-brick product only. We expect that the social dollars effect in an assorted product community would be weaker than that of a single product community given the potential diffusion of customer interest over multiple brands and/or product categories. Second, our results are quite different from the two other studies that quantified changes in customer behavior as a consequence of joining a customer community (Algesheimer et al. 2010, Zhu et al. 2012). The most direct comparison can be made with Algesheimer et al. (2010), which found that participation in eBay Germany’s customer community leads to null or small negative effects on economic outcomes. eBay can be contrasted with most e-commerce websites in that consumers play the role of both seller and buyer. As the authors note in their study, customers who join the community become educated about both the site as well as the behavior of other buyers and sellers. This education leads them to be more efficient and effective in their own marketing behavior, which leads to fewer listings. We propose that the customer community we investigate may be more representative of firm-sponsored online customer communities in general. In such communities, consumers engage with one another in generally positive social interactions pertaining to shared product or consumption interests rather than in competitive transactions to determine best prices (eBay) or loan interest rates (Prosper.com). Thus, in many ways, our results may be seen as complementary to those found in the above studies with the difference in results likely driven by the distinct nature of the sponsoring firm’s business model (and the resulting nature of its online customer community).

Applying our analysis to each of order size and order frequency as dependent variables, we find an increase in order frequency due to membership in the customer community (Table 4). The increase in average purchase size, however, is nonsignificant (4.3%). Order frequency appears to drive the majority of the social dollar effect. We observe nearly three additional purchase occasions over the 15-month observation period; this represents an 18.4% increase in order frequency. This finding is consistent with the online customer community literature which argues that the array of informational content and opportunities for social engagement available in the community should increase the number of visits the consumer is likely to make to the community website, as well as the conversion rate per visit (Brown et al. 2002, Holland and Baker 2001, McWilliam 2000), leading to an increase in order frequency but not necessarily in order value (Schau et al. 2009). Other reasons for the lack of significant change in the order value could be a threshold effect shown in shopping behavior (Wansink et al. 1998). In this case, the threshold is the monetary value of the order that qualifies for free shipping.

Given that the firm operates in online and offline channels, a reasonable hypothesis could be that the social dollars arise from differential expenditure across sales channels. Specifically, the online nature of the customer community we observe may cause social dollars to be generated more from the online channel or, in an extreme case, to originate entirely from channel switching. To assess this, we first determine whether there is a significant difference in the share of customer expenditure between the online and offline channels before and after the community is formed. We analyze the proportion of total sales for a given customer that comes from the online channel. We find that the online proportion increases by 13 points (Table 4, column 4), suggesting that the community does shift purchase behavior towards the online channel.

To assess the size of this shift, we replicate our basic analysis by channel and find that the total social dollar magnitude ($127.01) is composed of $87.79 from the online channel and $39.23 from retail (i.e., offline), representing a 37% and 8.9% increase in T2 purchases in the respective channels. Two things about this decomposition are noteworthy. First, as predicted by research reporting that the ability to exchange information in customer communities enhances loyalty to e-commerce providers (Srinivasan et al. 2002), 70% of the social dollars arise in the firm’s online channel. Second and perhaps more important, community membership seems to increase customer expenditure in the offline channel as well. To our knowledge, academic research has yet to consider the presence and magnitude of cross-channel effects of online social

\[ \text{ offline channel results are sensitive to specification, ranging from directionally positive (} p = 0.12 \text{) in the most conservative case reported here, to highly significant (} p < 0.001 \text{) when the entry/exit restriction is removed.} \]
Table 4  Treatment Effect on Total Spend, Average Basket Size, Purchase Frequency, and Channel Breakup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1a) Total spend (Online + Retail)</th>
<th>(1b) Total spend (Online + Retail)</th>
<th>(2) Average purchase</th>
<th>(3) Purchase frequency</th>
<th>(4) Proportion online</th>
<th>(5) Online spend</th>
<th>(6) Retail spend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>β₁ (Treatment)</td>
<td>-21.65 (-22.20)</td>
<td>12.09 (25.46)</td>
<td>-3.57** (0.93)</td>
<td>0.47 (0.47)</td>
<td>-0.04** (0.01)</td>
<td>-14.95 (11.78)</td>
<td>-6.61 (17.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β₂ (Post period)</td>
<td>59.94* (29.17)</td>
<td>33.53 (33.31)</td>
<td>-1.76 (1.23)</td>
<td>0.83 (0.61)</td>
<td>-0.07*** (0.01)</td>
<td>26.96† (15.48)</td>
<td>32.98 (23.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β₃ (Social dollar)</td>
<td>127.01*** (31.39)</td>
<td>148.54*** (35.96)</td>
<td>2.01 (1.32)</td>
<td>2.87*** (0.66)</td>
<td>0.130*** (0.01)</td>
<td>87.79*** (16.66)</td>
<td>39.23 (25.32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demographics

<p>| | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Female¹</td>
<td>33.81* (14.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (months)</td>
<td>4.80*** (0.20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average household size²</td>
<td>-17.62 (29.83)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median family income (× 1,000$)²</td>
<td>1.4e-3*** (4.9e-4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with computer access²</td>
<td>1223.8*** (306.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education spending ($)²</td>
<td>-0.16*** (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>511.38*** (20.63)</td>
<td>513.34** (192.81)</td>
<td>49.82*** (0.87)</td>
<td>11.42*** (0.43)</td>
<td>0.39*** (0.01)</td>
<td>137.78** (10.94)</td>
<td>373.61*** (16.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>18,328 (18,328)</td>
<td>13,458 (18,328)</td>
<td>16,328 (18,328)</td>
<td>18,328 (18,328)</td>
<td>18,328 (18,328)</td>
<td>18,328 (18,328)</td>
<td>18,328 (18,328)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

¹Gender inferred for 82% of sample using a standard “genderizer” database.
²County-level statistics.
³p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; †p < 0.1.

interactions such as those found in customer communities. This finding thus adds to the literature by documenting an economic measure of positive channel spillover for online social interactions.

Finally, we allow for the possibility that observable differences across the treatment and control groups could affect the existence and magnitude of the social dollar. We focus on demographics and tenure with the company before the launch of the community. Recall that we had only first names for each customer in our data. Using a standard “genderizer” list, we inferred gender for 82% of the sample. All analyses that follow that include gender are restricted to this 82%. As shown in Table 2, group comparison t-tests indicate that the proportion of males was slightly lower (albeit statistically significant) in the treatment group than in the control group. There were also minor differences in the average household size and computer access between the two groups, with the average treatment group household being slightly larger. The distribution of the sample across the 12 geographic regions (which correspond approximately to counties) observed in our data was not significantly different across the treatment and control groups (χ²(11) = 13.54, p = 0.26).

We replicate our main analysis with explicit controls for these minor differences across the treatment and control groups. Specifically, we add a vector of demographic controls (including gender, observed tenure with the firm, average household size, median family income, household educational spending, and computer access) to the main specification (Equation (1)). As can be seen from Table 4, we replicate our results after controlling for these demographic differences.⁷

4.2. Dealing with Self-Selection

While an experimental design involving random assignment to conditions is ideal, many field applications of panel estimators observe nonrandom group assignment (e.g., Autor 2003, Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006, Bronnenberg et al. 2010). Given that customers

⁷We report the estimates of the social dollar in Table 4 with the demographics entering as main effects. We also ran analyses where we included interactions (treatment × demographics) and find that our results do not materially change. Detailed results are available from the authors on request.

⁶A list of over 100,000 international first names recommending assignment of records to one of three categories (e.g., “Christopher”, male; “Christina”, female; “Chris”, unclassified).
in our field data are not randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, the two groups could differ, especially on unobservables, and such a difference could drive treatment group members to join the community. While the model and the selection parameters of the before-and-after structure of the data reduces these selection concerns by design, we pursue additional robustness checks to more thoroughly assess a selection-based explanation for our results. Given that we observe the behavior of consumers in T1 (before the community), differences on unobservables become an issue only if the unobservables have a differential interaction with the treatment group (i.e., the formation of the community). For example, it could be that the customers in the treatment group were more engaged with the firm in T1. Previous research has shown that customer communities have a much larger effect on more engaged customers (Algesheimer et al. 2005). Our strategy first examines the possibility of self-selection affecting our results via statistical analyses. We then exploit a feature of our data, i.e., the fact that not all consumers join the community at the same time, to create a new control group and determine whether self-selection could indeed account for our results.

### 4.2.1. Selection on Observables

Though customers in the treatment group did not appear to be markedly different from those in the control group based on the demographics we observe (Table 2), it is still possible that observable differences between customers in these two groups may drive differences in their purchases. We therefore ran analyses to determine if shopping behavior in the pre-period (expenditure, purchase frequency, variability in expenditure, all at the quarterly level) could predict membership in the community. We found that these behaviors did not predict membership in a logit model.

We also conducted a matching analysis using a “kernel matching estimator” (Heckman et al. 1998b). The matching estimator computes the effect of a treatment on the treated by matching each treated person with an untreated person based on observable characteristics. The results of the analysis (shown in Table 5, column 3) show that the social dollar estimate is significant at 20.99% in magnitude. We also replicated this result using a “nearest neighbor” matching estimator (Heckman et al. 1998a, Abadie and Imbens 2006) which produced an estimate for the social dollar of 21.86%. The results were also substantively invariant to the number of nearest neighbors chosen for the matching process (using matching based on 1, 5, and 20 nearest neighbors). Finally, the results were also insensitive to the choice of kernel (all additional results are available from the authors on request). Overall, therefore, these analyses suggest that observable differences do not predict the propensity to join and the existence of the social dollar.

### 4.2.2. Selection on Unobservables

In this section, we conduct two types of analyses to see if selection on unobservables can explain our results. In the first set of analyses, we conduct different formal statistical tests to check for this. In the second set of analyses, we exploit a unique feature of our data to set up a control group by using customers from the treatment group before they select into the treatment.

Table 5, column 4 presents results of a selection model based on the Heckman selection framework. We do not find evidence for selection as the selection correction term \( \lambda \) is insignificant with a \( p \)-value = 0.85 (for more details on the implications of the significance of \( \lambda \), see Heckman 1979, p. 158 and Puhani 2000, p. 55). An interesting observation is that \( \rho \), the correlation coefficient between the selection equation and outcome equation errors, is negative at \( -0.0527 \). This suggests that a positive shock to the probability of selection reduces the treatment effect through a negative shock to the outcome (see Shaver 1998, Lemke and Reed 2001). In other words, the negative directional result above indicates that if there was selection, accounting for it is likely to increase the social dollar magnitude relative to our current estimate (which is based on there being no selection). The estimate of social dollars based on the Heckman selection framework is 32.82%, again supporting our main result as conservative. We also used a semi-parametric estimator (Choi 1990, Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, Heckman et al. 1998a, b) that takes a weaker stance on the joint distribution of errors in the outcome and selection equations. The estimate of the social dollar using this analysis was 20.29% (details of this analysis are available from the authors on request). To further test for the effect of unobserved selection on our estimates, we report two other analyses in the

| Table 5 | Expenditure Regression Results Assessing Selection |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | OLS |  | Kernel matching | Heckman selection* |
|  | Two-periods | Monthly |  |  |
| \( \beta_3 \) (social dollar) | $127.01 | $8.07 | $142.09 | $221.98 |
| (14.43) | (9.92) | (15.56) | (75.36) |
| 18.77% | 18.34% | 20.99% | 32.82% |

Notes. SEs appear in parentheses below estimates (SEs are clustered at the user level for the monthly OLS model). Bootstrapped SEs with 100 replications are reported for the selection estimator.

* Ignoring the non-significance of the \( p \)-parameter.
online appendix (available as supplemental material at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2014.0890). These are the Rosenbaum bounds approach and the Relative Correlation Restriction (RCR) approach. The results from both of these analyses also suggest that selection based on unobservables is unlikely to have driven our results.

We now turn to a different approach to check for selection on unobservables. Recall that while the community formation appears as an exogenous shock to customers of the firm, customers are not required to join the community at the same time. In the five quarters after the community was launched, the proportion of our treatment group customers who joined was 44%, 17%, 14%, 14%, and 11% in Q6, Q7, Q8, Q9, and Q10, respectively. In other words, the majority of the customers (56%) in our (right-truncated) sample joined after the first quarter.9

Once the community was available to customers, if there is a differential interaction between the availability of the customer community and the unobservable attribute(s), then a change in transaction behavior should manifest itself even if a (future) member had not yet joined the community. We present a series of analyses showing that social dollars are not driven by whether some customers join the community, but that they occur only once customers choose to join the community. In other words, it is the act of joining and not the mere availability of the treatment that impacts transaction behavior. In fact, the temporal joining data discussed above already suggest that the availability of the customer community was not enough to sort customers on an unobservable attribute. If this had been the case, a majority of customers would have joined the community immediately (in Q6).

In the first analysis, we group customers who join the customer community within specific quarterly time intervals into cohorts and contrast cohort behavior across time to see if this impacts the size of the social dollar. A challenge here, however, is that the control group definition for these cohorts is not obvious. This is because our current control group by definition consists of people who do not join the community during the 15-month period of its operation that we observe. We therefore use a different strategy to test for the possibility that differences in the time period in which customers join the community impacts the social dollar. We first consider all customers who join the community in the first quarter after the formation of the community (Q6) as our treatment group cohort. The control group for this cohort includes all customers in the treatment group who did not join the community until after the first quarter of its operation; that is, they joined the community between Q7 and Q10, inclusive (Table 6, Panel B, column 1). If our prediction (that behavior changes when rather than whether they join) is correct, until these customers join the community, we should be able to treat them as control group customers. This analysis can be seen in the same spirit as the falsification analysis carried out in Goldfarb and Tucker (2011).

We perform the analysis for pre (T1) and post (T2) periods of equivalent length limited by the duration of the second period for which the treatment cohort were community members. Analysis for subsequent “join cohorts” proceeds similarly (Table 6, Panel B, columns 2–4). As shown in the table, the social dollar effect is positive and significant for all four cohorts. This suggests that even when we restrict our analysis to all customers who possessed the (presumed) unobservable attributes that interacted with the treatment, and divided them into treatment and control groups as above, the social dollar effect is present and significant. Thus, it is not whether they join the community, but when they join that matters.

We next focus on a second cohort-based analysis of customers who join the customer community. However, here we compare behavior within cohorts by comparing a cohort’s quarterly expenditure post joining the community with their own quarterly expenditure pre joining the community. Specifically, we compare the average T1 quarterly revenue for customers who joined the community in a specific quarter with their average revenue in each quarter after becoming members. For example, for the cohort of customers who joined in the first quarter after the community launch (Q6, column 1 in Table 6, Panel A) we observe their revenue in each of four T2 quarters after the join quarter, and compare each of these four quarters after joining to the T1 quarterly mean. The analysis proceeds similarly for those who joined in later quarters until those who joined in Q9 (column 4), for whom we only observe one additional quarter in T2 after this time (Q10). As shown in Table 6, Panel A, 9 of the 10 quarterly comparisons in the table are statistically significant. These results further support the argument that there is a significant change in the behavior of these customers based on when (rather than whether) they join the community.

In the above analysis, note that we do not have a control group. One way to reduce the impact of not having a control group would be to shorten the window before and after joining the community in a “regression discontinuity” style analysis. For this analysis, we use the day of joining as the “origin” and contrast mean expenditure before joining with mean expenditure before joining with
Table 6  "Join Quarter" Cohort Group Comparisons/"Join Quarter" Cohort Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(A) Join cohort group comparisons</th>
<th>(B) Join cohort analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment join quarter cohort</td>
<td>Treatment join quarter cohort pre/post period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1 quarterly mean spend</td>
<td>Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 week</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1 quarterly mean spend</td>
<td>Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 week</td>
<td>72.31 94.04 92.47 92.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 week</td>
<td>t-stat for T1 qtly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean versus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 Q7 spend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 weeks</td>
<td>13.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 Q8 spend</td>
<td>10.26*** 2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 Q8 spend</td>
<td>11.24** 2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 Q9 spend</td>
<td>23.08*** 7.42*** 5.69*** 8.70***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 Q10 spend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 weeks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control join quarter cohort</td>
<td>observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre/post period definition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7–Q10</td>
<td>39.76***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8–Q10</td>
<td>41.75***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9–Q10</td>
<td>25.70**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10</td>
<td>56.00**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5/Q6</td>
<td>(4.92) (7.85) (11.86) (19.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions Q6/Q7 Q4–Q5/Q6–Q7 Q3–Q5/Q6–Q8 Q2–Q5/Q6–Q9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

\*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table 7  "Regression-Discontinuity" Style Comparisons of Treatment Group Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Window</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>$ pre</th>
<th>$ post</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–1 week</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>7,865</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>17.25</td>
<td>20.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>7,859</td>
<td>6.77</td>
<td>20.26</td>
<td>20.81***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>7,850</td>
<td>8.42</td>
<td>22.23</td>
<td>20.65***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>7,846</td>
<td>10.17</td>
<td>23.91</td>
<td>19.91***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 days</td>
<td>7,844</td>
<td>11.87</td>
<td>25.19</td>
<td>18.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 days</td>
<td>7,841</td>
<td>13.36</td>
<td>26.71</td>
<td>17.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 days</td>
<td>7,839</td>
<td>15.07</td>
<td>27.86</td>
<td>16.64***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–4 weeks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 days</td>
<td>7,807</td>
<td>21.86</td>
<td>34.81</td>
<td>15.86***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 days</td>
<td>7,760</td>
<td>27.28</td>
<td>39.81</td>
<td>14.64***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 days</td>
<td>7,698</td>
<td>31.69</td>
<td>44.20</td>
<td>13.81***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*\*p < 0.001.

for us to rule out the effect of all possible unobservables with certainty, it is unlikely, given our robustness analyses, that they played a role in our estimation of social dollars.

4.3. Alternative Explanations for the Social Dollar

In this section, we explore a variety of alternative explanations for our finding of the social dollar, considering both cross-sectional and longitudinal explanations.

4.3.1. The Role of Outliers. We first focus on the possibility that the existence and magnitude of the social dollar is primarily driven by outliers on the expenditure dimension (i.e., a cross-sectional difference). In other words, it is possible that a few heavy spenders are driving the result. To check this, we divide our treatment and control groups into expenditure quartiles using their total purchases in T1 as the baseline. We then conduct a separate analysis for each quartile. As shown in Table 8, the social dollar is statistically significant for all four quartiles and has the strongest statistical significance level for the bottom three. In terms of magnitude, the largest coefficient estimates are for the middle two quartiles, approximating the “average” customer in our primary analysis sample. The statistically significant, but relatively weaker effect in the top quartile is driven by the variance in this high purchase volume group. It is also likely that the firm already accounts for a greater share of wallet for these heavy spending customers, thus leading to a smaller estimate for their social dollars. Overall, this analysis strongly suggests that our results are not driven by a change in expenditure for a minority of customers, and especially not only by customers who already spent heavily with the firm prior to the launch of the community.

As expected just after joining. The shorter the temporal window on each side of the treatment, the less likely that factors besides the treatment will affect outcomes (Imbens and Lemieux 2008, Hartmann et al. 2011). We examine behavior in the shortest possible window we observe (i.e., a day) as well as two, three, four, five, six, and seven days. As expected (Table 7), the mean expenditure increases (for both pre- and post-launch) as the duration of the window gets longer. We find that the post-launch mean expenditure is higher than the pre-launch expenditure and that the difference is statistically significant for all of the windows we consider.

Overall, the analyses presented above suggest that it is unlikely that a differential interaction between unobservable attributes and the treatment was a material driver of our findings. While it is impossible

10The sample size changes for each window as we need to drop treatment group customers for whom the end of the after window exceeds the end date of our data.
4.3.2. The Novelty Effect. We next explore whether social dollars may arise due to the novelty of the community. Customers may respond positively to the community as soon as it is launched but then lose interest and revert to their normal (pre-community) purchase behavior, i.e., a longitudinal explanation. To test this, we estimated the social dollar using our analysis on a rolling quarter basis. We first focused on three months after the launch of the community to create a treatment time period and used three months before the launch of the community as the control time period. Thus, all activity in the first quarter after the launch of the community is contrasted with the first quarter before the launch of the community. We then extend the treatment time period to the second quarter, i.e., months four through six after the launch of the community, and add the corresponding control time period before the launch of the community. As shown in Table 9, the social dollar persists over time, with the significance of the difference the weakest in the one quarter window but becoming very strong in the two to five quarter windows. The quarterly change in social dollars over each prior quarter appears persistent at $22.63 ($44.25 less $21.62), $20.41, $37.21, and $25.14 from the second through fifth quarter in T2, respectively.

4.3.3. Differential Trends in Customer Loyalty. Another factor that could be driving the social dollars estimate is that there is a differential response to the firm across the treatment and control groups over time. For example, customers who end up in the treatment group start liking the firm more and more before the launch of the community. This could result in a situation where the total expenditure in T1 for the treatment and control groups is not statistically different (as shown in Table 1), but the increased liking results in significant divergence between the treatment and control groups. With the passage of time, this divergent trend could widen the gap between the two groups. This difference could improperly be ascribed to customers joining the online community. To test for this possibility, we perform across-group trend analysis of total revenue for the treatment and control groups. The statistical analysis we conduct is a mixed-effects model estimated by restricted maximum likelihood (Verbeke and Molenberghs 2000, Wallace and Green 2001). This approach is preferred over traditional repeated measures using generalized linear model (GLM) methods as it allows for a more accurate depiction of serial correlation and correlated error structure, and can accommodate unbalanced group sizes. This model is represented as

\[ R_{iq} = X_i \beta + Z_{iq} u + (X_i \beta Z_{iq} u) + e_{iq}, \]

where \( R_{iq} \) is a 5×1 vector representing the total revenue of customer \( i \) in quarter \( q \) within the five quarters of T1, predicted by the fixed component of analysis group \( (X_i \beta) \), the random time component \( (Z_{iq} u) \), and their interaction \( (X_i \beta Z_{iq} u) \). To control for expected serial correlation and correlated error structure in the within-customer revenue trend we allow an AR(1) process on the error term \( (e_{iq}) \). The interaction term \( (X_i \beta Z_{iq} u) \), which would indicate a difference across comparison groups in the linear slope of the purchase trend across the five quarters of T1, is non-significant \( (t\text{-test} = 0.50, p = 0.62) \). Given that the quarterly purchase trend approximates an inverted-U shape (see Table 2), we also specified a model adding a quadratic main effect and interaction for time. The quadratic interaction term was also non-significant \( (t\text{-test} = 1.47, p = 0.14) \), failing to support a difference in curvilinear trends.\(^{11}\) As an additional test, in Table 2, we present simple group mean comparisons by quarter within the T1 period. This also supports nonsignificant differences in each of the five quarters before the community launch.

These results allow us to rule out the possibility that any differences that we find between the treatment

\(^{11}\) The results were also identical using a traditional GLM repeated measures model for both the linear (Huynh-Feldt adjusted \( F(3.5, 32,355) = 0.81, p = 0.51 \)) and quadratic interaction terms (Huynh-Feldt adjusted \( F(2.0, 18,740) = 1.76, p = 0.17 \)). We also replicated this finding at the individual level (as opposed to the group level) using a probit model. Details on these analyses are available on request from the authors.
and control groups after the launch of the community are driven by differential trends in behavior before the community launch.

4.3.4. Outlier Months. The majority of our analyses have been conducted comparing customer behavior in the after period to the before period (in aggregate) as well as at the quarter level. However, the social dollar may be driven essentially by month to month variations in expenditure. Note that the control group allows us to account for basic seasonality patterns. This analysis demonstrates that the effect is present consistently in each month across our data period. In other words, it is not the case that the social dollar exists only for a small number of months.

We conducted two analyses to test this. In one, we pooled the data; in the other we ran it month by month. In the first test, we regressed monthly transaction expenditures for the treatment and control group users with demographics and month fixed effects on the right-hand side (see Table 10). The social dollar estimate using this specification is significant at 22.49% ($9.40/$41.79). In the second test, we ran our main panel data regression model using only data for each month with demographics (see Table 11). We find that the social dollar is significant in 11 of 12 months (May is marginally significant at $t = 1.87$) and ranges from 15.47% to 30.21%. Both of these analyses show that the social dollar is present consistently in each month across our data period. We therefore shorten the time frame of our main analysis to 2, 3, and 4 weeks.

4.3.5. Joining for a Reason Unrelated to the Online Community. Customers may also join the community for a reason that is not driven by an affinity for the retailer and/or its community. For example, if a customer was dissatisfied with a purchase, she may be driven to join the community and warn others not to buy. A customer may also join essentially to obtain more information about a product recently purchased from the site in terms of functionality, use, etc. These are likely to be specific situations where the customer pursues immediate action. In these cases, we should expect to see no effects of joining (or even a negative effect if the customer joins due to an adverse reaction to a purchase), especially in a short time frame after joining the community. We therefore shorten the time frame of our main analysis to 2, 3, and 4 weeks. We find evidence for the social dollar in each of these situations (ref. last three rows of Table 7), suggesting that customers are not joining the community for reasons other than affinity to the retailer and/or the community.

4.4. Robustness Checks vis-à-vis Sample Construction

In all of the analyses reported so far, we have imposed the requirement that all customers in our sample must be loyalty card holders and that they need to trans-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>(Std. Err.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>-3.24***</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment x Post (social dollar)</td>
<td>9.40***</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month_2</td>
<td>-4.47***</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month_3</td>
<td>-1.97</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month_4</td>
<td>-6.03***</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month_5</td>
<td>-3.45***</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month_6</td>
<td>-1.73</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month_7</td>
<td>-6.94***</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month_8</td>
<td>-5.61***</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month_9</td>
<td>-9.00</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month_10</td>
<td>-10.88***</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month_11</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month_12</td>
<td>29.29***</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average HHL size</td>
<td>-1.86</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education spending</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer access</td>
<td>75.09***</td>
<td>(7.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (F = 1)</td>
<td>2.11***</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty tenure</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (Month_1)</td>
<td>-21.49***</td>
<td>(4.19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. Month_2 = February, Month_3 = March, etc. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; † $p < 0.1$.

act at least once in each of the pre- and post-periods. To determine that our sampling strategy is not driving our result, we relax this requirement. To do this,

12 As described earlier in §3, another aspect of our sample is that the size of the treatment group (7,909 customers) is much larger than the control group data (1,255 customers). To ensure that this asymmetry did not bias our results, we randomly sampled 1,255 customers from the analysis treatment group 10 times (with replacement) and re-estimated the model on these data sets. We found that the statistical significance and magnitude of the social dollar effect was robust to group sample size differences in all 10 cases (these results are available from the authors on request).
we restrict our analysis to online channel shoppers who do not have a loyalty card. As there is no way to track offline/retail sales without the use of a loyalty card, this restriction ensures that these shoppers only transact online. The online channel represents approximately 10% of customer expenditure with the firm during the observation period.

For online channel shoppers who are not loyalty card holders, the estimate of social dollars is $55.37 (SE = 16.35, p < 0.001) or 20.81% of post-period expenditure if we require at least one transaction in the pre- and post-periods. If we relax the entry/exit restriction (for the online channel only), the estimate of social dollars is $78.43 (SE = 5.75, p < 0.001) or 46.52% of post-period expenditure.

Next, we relax the entry/exit restriction for the loyalty card sample that enables observation of online and offline channel sales. In this case, the estimate of the social dollar is $170.96 (SE = 22.09, p < 0.001) or 28.85% of post-period expenditure. The much larger magnitude of the latter two numbers is not surprising as these capture the expenditure of customers who transacted in the post-period but not in the pre-period (these could be new customers or current customers that did not transact in the pre-period). Overall, these results suggest that our primary analysis sampling strategy (loyalty card holders AND no entry/exit [at least one transaction each in the pre- and post-periods]) provides a conservative estimate of the social dollar (18.77%).

5. Moderating the Social Dollar
In the previous sections, we have documented the existence and magnitude of social dollars in the context we examine and demonstrated that they are robust to self-selection concerns and alternative explanations. Next we assess mechanisms that should be related to the observed increase in expenditure by customer community participants. Based on the discussion in §2, our predictions are as follows: (a) we expect a negative (positive) effect of lurking (posting), (b) a bigger effect as the preference heterogeneity for a product category increases, and (c) a positive effect of the volume of friend ties on the size of the social dollar at the individual member level.

5.1. Data and Model
To develop our measure of product preference heterogeneity, we restrict this analysis to the book category (i.e., excluding music, movies, and other products). The subcategory classification data needed for this analysis is only available for this category. Books are the firm’s largest product category, representing 77.3% of treatment and 76.9% of control group expenditures in the 15-month pre-period (t-test = 0.69, p > 0.45). Five-hundred sixteen Amazon Mechanical Turk workers residing in the United States with a performance rating of 95% or higher were each paid a nominal fee to rate the perceived preference heterogeneity of three randomly selected book subcategories of 53 available from the firm (computers, fiction, religion, etc.). This resulted in approximately 30 ratings per book subcategory. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with five previously validated seven-point scale items (see Feick and Higie 1992).13

Scale reliability was above the desired threshold (α = 0.74) and the items converged on a single factor solution. The mean ranking of book categories was 4.64 on a seven-point scale, with a standard deviation of 0.47.14 The top three book subcategories in terms of preference heterogeneity were art, fiction, and poetry. The bottom three categories were math textbooks, general reference, and language (instruction). Subcategories closest to the preference heterogeneity index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11 Panel Regression Model for Each Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; † p < 0.1.

13 The scale items were: (1) “Most people want the same things from [subcategory] books,” (2) “Personal tastes and preferences are not important in how people choose [subcategory] books,” (3) “People look for different things when it comes to [subcategory] books,” (4) “Whether people will enjoy a particular [subcategory] book is very much an individual, personal matter,” and (5) “People can generally agree on what makes a [subcategory] book good or bad.”

14 A detailed list of book subcategories and their ratings is available from the authors on request.
mean were game-related, general psychology, and true crime. The results show face validity as customer preferences are likely to be more heterogeneous for poetry books than for math textbooks. The analysis that follows incorporates each product subcategory’s preference heterogeneity index as a normalized continuous measure.

Consistent with prior research (Schlosser 2005), our criterion for lurkers is that the community participant has not posted any content at the community website during the observation period. Based on this definition, the number of lurkers in the book purchaser data was 3,326, representing 72.2% of the sample. We use a dummy variable to capture lurkers versus posters (where lurker = 1 and poster = 0). The moderating effect of this social benefit of community participation is therefore the coefficient of the dummy variable.15

The friend ties information provided by the firm is a count variable representing the number of member-member ties established by a given community member during the observation period. In the data used for this analysis, 1,138 (24.7%) community members had at least one friend tie. Among those with a friend tie, the mean number of ties was 7.34 (SD = 17.77, max = 217). We use the count of friend ties as a continuous measure.15

Our analysis strategy for understanding the moderation of the social dollar by posting versus lurking (LURK), informational benefits (product preference heterogeneity: HETE), and friend ties (TIES) is as follows: We incorporate each of these terms as a moderator of the treatment-time \([I_s \times I_t]\) interaction in the basic model (Equation (1)), resulting in a three-way term indicating the extent to which the third-level moderator enhances or attenuates the social dollar effect. This can be specified as follows:

\[
R_{igt} = \beta_1 I_s + \beta_2 I_t + \beta_3 I_s I_t + \beta_4 (I_s I_t \cdot LURK)
+ \beta_5 (I_s I_t \cdot HETE) + \beta_6 (I_s I_t \cdot TIES) + \beta_7 X_{igt} + \epsilon_{igt}. (3)
\]

The parameters of interest are the coefficient of the three-way interaction term for each of the lurker dummy \((I_s I_t LURK)\), the product preference heterogeneity term \((HETE)\), and the friend ties term \((TIES)\).16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12</th>
<th>Moderating the Social Dollar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n = 5,544 \quad (T = 4,606, \quad C = 938))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Model 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment</strong></td>
<td>37.83**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(112.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td>141.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment \times Time</strong></td>
<td>47.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment \times Time \times LURK</strong></td>
<td>(-111.35***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment \times Time \times HETE</strong></td>
<td>(-1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment \times Time \times TIES</strong></td>
<td>3.96***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender (F)</strong></td>
<td>(-1.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average HHL size</strong></td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median family income</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Computer access (%)</strong></td>
<td>557.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(179.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education spending</strong></td>
<td>(-0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loyalty tenure (months)</strong></td>
<td>0.90***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>(-223.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(112.34)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. DV, expenditure on books. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

\(^{*}p < 0.05; \quad ^{**}p < 0.01; \quad ^{***}p < 0.001; \quad ^{†}p < 0.10.\)

5.2. Results

We estimate two models (Table 12). Model 1 replicates our main result for the book category alone, with the coefficient of the \([Treat \times Time]\) term being positive and significant, representing a 25.3% (47.27/186.84) estimate of the social dollar for the book category. Model 2 adds the three community participation moderators. The \([Treat \times Time \times LURK]\) interaction is negative and significant, while the \([Treat \times Time \times TIES]\) term is positive and significant signifying a positive benefit of greater connectedness in customer communities. The \([Treat \times Time \times HETE]\) interaction is nonsignificant.

Overall, this analysis provides support for the social benefits of customer communities as mechanisms related to the social dollars effect we observe. Notably, we are unable to uncover a significant moderating effect of informational benefits \((HETE)\), highlighting the potential relative importance of social benefits \((LURK \text{ and } TIES)\), at least within this constrained sample of book products. Also, our indirect measure of the informational benefits conceptually linked to customer communities may not have strongly captured this potential benefit. These results are novel in the sense that they provide behavioral evidence...
for the theoretical predictions in the extant customer community literature. From a more practical point of view, our results show an objective and quantifiable link between specific attributes of customer communities and economic outcomes.

6. Managerial Implications
Our results suggest a significant increase in expenditures from customers that joined the firm’s customer community, and that this increase is linked to social behaviors related to key attributes of customer communities. Managers can use our results on how customer community attributes and benefits moderated the social dollar to improve community design and interaction mechanisms. For example, as revealed in our analysis in §5, the difference in posting versus lurking in the community is linked to a significant positive increase in an individual’s contribution of social dollars. A subsequent regression analysis revealed that there is a positive and significant marginal effect of each unit of any kind of posting on consumer expenditure (restricting our analysis to posters only). We find that this effect size (at the mean level of posting) accounts for about 3% of the total expenditures post joining the customer community.17 Thus, before accounting for the possible impact of a customer’s posts on other community members (i.e., word-of-mouth (WOM) influence), the firm has evidence supporting the pursuit of tactics to encourage posting in the community to enhance the return on their community investment. Our findings also indicate that the social bonds made by establishing friendships in the community are linked to the customer’s economic bond with the firm, representing approximately 16% of expenditures post joining the community at the mean level of ties. As such, developing community functionality that assists customers in connecting with either existing real world friends or high potential virtual friends may represent a particularly important priority for managers.

Besides the direct economic benefits to the firm from setting up the online customer community, there are also considerable indirect benefits in terms of the information the community generates for the firm. For example, the data produced as a by-product of the community offers a more complete picture of each customer’s preferences and behavior by integrating pre-purchase, purchase event, and post-purchase activities (e.g., community interactions and purchases). The firm providing the data for our analysis also reports that the massive quantity of user-generated content produced by community members strongly improves the firm’s position in organic search results (i.e., the website appears before competitors when its product offering is sought on major search engines).

Finally, from the firm’s perspective, an important question is whether the launch of a customer community results in increased customer expenditure and profits sufficient to recoup the investment made in terms of the community’s development and ongoing operations. We approached the firm and obtained estimates of community development and operating costs.18 Based on the estimated social dollars, community costs, and firm-level margin percentages available in public financial statements we estimate that this firm broke even on its investment when 33,000 of its current customers (our conservative restriction case) signed up for the community. Given that the firm acquired over 260,000 members within the first 15 months after community launch, this appears to have been a very profitable investment for the firm, especially as this number is likely comprised of a mix of current and newly-acquired customers.

7. Conclusion
Our paper adds to the small, but growing literature on the economic impact of online customer communities. While there is much theoretical and survey-based research available on the motivations of consumers who participate in such communities, there is a paucity of research that uses behavioral (market) data to quantify the possible economic benefits to firms that set up these communities and the mechanisms through which these benefits may occur. Using a novel data set from a firm that operates such a community, we quantified the incremental expenditure resulting from customer engagement in a community. The availability of customer expenditure before and after the formation of the customer community allows us to create treatment and control groups, helping to rule out multiple selection issues. We find that social dollars represent a double-digit increase in revenue once customers join the community we observe. These social dollars arise primarily via more frequent orders with the firm rather than increased shopping basket sizes, a result consistent with prior theorizing.

As is important for studies that leverage natural events, we conduct a series of robustness analyses
and test for alternative explanations to ensure that our estimate of social dollars can be attributed to customer membership in the community. We find that our estimate is robust to the novelty effect, to differences in expenditure levels across customers before they join the community, to temporal trends between the treatment and control groups before they join the community, and to observable and unobservable attributes that characterize each group. Furthermore, the social dollar persists over time and exists in the online and offline channels.\(^{19}\) Investigation of five potential alternative explanations for the effect we observe did not support these alternatives.

We then examined theoretically-supported moderators of the social dollar. We find that participants who partake more in the social benefit of communities by posting user-generated content tend to exhibit higher social dollars relative to participants who are less actively engaged in content-sharing in the community (lurkers). We also find that the extent to which consumers create structured social relationships in the community enhances their contribution of social dollars to the firm. However, we did not find a significant effect for the informational benefit of communities that we expected to observe through increased purchases of products high in preference heterogeneity. Furthermore, we (approximately) documented the direct benefit of setting up the community to the firm by reporting the small number of customer participants required to earn a return on this investment. Note that it is not a given that managers will observe such a large direct benefit in other settings and our results must be interpreted in that light. However, besides the direct benefits, there are also many indirect benefits that may be reaped by the firm-operator of an online customer community such as the one we observe in this paper. At a minimum, we hope this research encourages managers to at least consider whether setting up their own online customer community might generate a positive ROI, and provides guidance on the community attributes they should prioritize to help maximize the community’s economic success.

Our analysis suffers from some limitations, primarily due to our data. First, we only examine consumer behavior in a small range of experiential goods categories. Second, our data extends to only 15 months after the formation of the community, restricting our ability to investigate longer-term effects on customers and the firm. Third, and as discussed earlier, since we only observe customer-level purchase events in the firm’s offline (retail) channel for customers with a loyalty card (as the firm otherwise had no customer-level identifier for in-store purchases), our ability to extrapolate the results to the firm’s entire customer base is limited. That said, our supplementary analysis of the social dollar for customers without a loyalty card in the online channel (§4.4) reveals that the effect for these non-loyalty customers was even stronger than that of our primary analysis sample. Fourth, given that we do not assign customers to treatment and control groups randomly, we cannot rule out the effect of unobservable attributes (i.e., self-selection) with certainty, although multiple analyses suggest that this is highly unlikely to be an issue. Finally, given that we do not observe customers who also shop for the product categories offered by the firm at its competitors, we cannot pinpoint the source of social dollars precisely (i.e., market growth versus store-switching). We hope that future work might address these limitations.

Supplemental Material
Supplemental material to this paper is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2014.0890.

Acknowledgments
The authors thank the editor-in-chief, the associate editor, two anonymous reviewers, Utpal Dholakia, Pete Fader, Ron Goettler, Anja Lambrecht, S. Sriram, Melanie Zaglia, and seminar participants at the University of Maryland, London Business School, University of Connecticut, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, Tsinghua University, LMU Munich, HEC Paris, University of California, Davis, University of North Carolina, Universidad Carlos III, University of Colorado, University of Rochester, and participants at the 2011 ART Forum for valuable feedback and an anonymous firm for providing the data. The standard disclaimer applies. All correspondence by regular mail should be sent to the first author at Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, 701 Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109.

References

\(^{19}\) As reported earlier, the offline channel effect is sensitive to sample specification. At a minimum, the results suggest that the online community does not cannibalize the offline channel.


